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Cf in this regard Du Plessis Introduction to Law 57-63; For nuanced and insightful discussions of this influence cf Van der Walt 1996 TSAR (3) 521; Van der Walt 1996 TSAR (4) 626; Van der Walt 1992 THRHR 170. 5 For a helpful overview, relating to the Humboldt contribution in particular, cf Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 608. 6 One of these scholars, John Dugard, thought that consistent reliance on the Roman-Dutch (common) law could have boosted the safeguarding of basic human rights in apartheid South Africa and that many of the ills of apartheid were attributable to a lack of rigorous reliance on this "rights-friendly" source of South African law: Dugard 1971 SALJ 181 and 3/30
In the lively debates foreshadowing, accompanying and assessing the first tottering steps of constitutional democracy in South Africa during the 1990s, legal and constitutional comparison were dominant, and among the jurisdictions sourced for comparative examples Germany (and Canada) suddenly moved to the forefront. A number of South African scholars writing about various aspects of our transition to democracy, professed indebtedness to German sources, but not necessarily because these sources breathe the spirit of principledness. 7 For the past ten years or so constitutional scholars have not (re-)turned to "the German example" as source of comparative information with an intensity and enthusiasm paralleling that of the mid-nineties. Most comparative studies referring to Germany 8 actually saw the light when South Africa's transitional or interim Constitution 9 was still in force.
10
The major object of this conference is to explore with (and for the benefit of) South African scholars, eligible for Von Humboldt stipends, possibilities for postdoctoral research in constitutional and administrative law in Germany. In this background paper I intend pursuing this object in mainly three ways (and not necessarily strictly in the sequence below):
• First, to explore the relevance of the German tradition of scholarship for South African legal scholars doing research on matters constitutional.
• Secondly, to reflect on possible reasons for strong South African-German affinities in matters constitutional.
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 393 397. Dugard was educated at one of the (erstwhile?) bastions of "principled legal thinking" in South Africa, namely the Faculty of Law at the University of Stellenbosch. 7
Francois Venter's attempt to adapt nineteenth century pandectism's "principled" theoretical framework for (private-law) subjective rights to use in public law, was the exception and not the rule (cf Venter Publiekregtelike Verhouding) which attracted criticism; cf Van der Vyver "Doctrine of Among which an article by De Waal 1995 SAJHR 1 is foremost. 
4/30
• Thirdly, to reflect on the consequences of the affinities above-said as they have manifested themselves in South Africa's two constitutional texts since 1994 and in our constitutional scholarship and jurisprudence. Here I shall mainly devote attention to some developments since the commencement of South Africa's "final Constitution" 11 in 1997. However, at pains to preface rather than pre-empt deliberations on particular issues and themes, this third aspect of the paper will be restricted to bare essentials.
As far as the first two aspects of the paper are concerned, I intend sharing a moderate measure of personal experience too, and this will inevitably put an anecdotal spin on my presentation. I mention this principally to forewarn myself that a successful anecdote is one not centred on the person of the anecdotist, but on the illustrative value of the narrative involved. In case I am a failure as an anecdotist let me offer all those who are age-wise still eligible for a 14 In the process of actual constitution-making -both during the multi-party negotiations preceding the adoption of the transitional Constitution in 1993 and, later, in the Constitutional Assembly where the final (1996) Constitution took shape -a "German presence" (eventually manifesting itself in both end products) was tangible.
There is no single explanation for the consequential German influence on constitution-making and the inception of constitutional democracy in South Africa. As suggested before conventional academic affinities in law do not quite explain this phenomenon (but are also not wholly unrelated to it). Mentally many white Afrikaans speaking South Africans in apartheid South Africa identified with the "Germanic" traits in the German Volksgeist. For a long time German was the third language of preference in many an Afrikaans medium, secondary school. Germanist fellow-feelings among some Afrikaners even engendered concurrence in the Nazi notion of "an Arian Herrnvolk", remarkably pulling itself up by its bootstraps after a devastating war -against demonic forces that many Afrikaners, at any rate, regarded as hostile to their cause too. 
III
From experience I can say that in the realm of public law scholarship in Germany the phenomenon going by the name "typical German" is rather "We know that the challenges facing South Africa today are in many ways comparable to those that faced Germany after the Second World War. In as much as we benefited immensely from the support of the German people in the struggle against apartheid, we can learn much by drawing on your valuable experiences in reconstruction and development. The German constitution has, for example, become a popular reference point for South African experts. We believe we can learn much from Germany in the field of combating crime. Above all, history has placed economic reconstruction and national reconciliation at the centre of the challenges faced by both countries." (see ANC 1995 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1995/sp950911.html 21 Nov).
L DU PLESSIS PER 2005(1)
9/30 elusive -especially the "typical German intellectual/professor". Typicalness in German legal scholarship is (typically) associated with the "principled legal thinking" of Begriffsjuriprudenz, 21 perceiving the law as a self-contained, rational system of general norms. Legal problems are solved when, through deductive reasoning, a concrete situation is subsumed under a norm appropriate to the exigencies of that type of situation. The state is the source of law and law, in its turn, allegedly rests on an independent foundation of reason and logic. Courts are autonomous institutions that apply the law in a systematic (even mechanistic) way as if it were a system of fixed (and predictable) rules.
The "is" and the "ought" of law are markedly distinct, as are "law" and "morality" as well as "law" and "politics".
German public lawyers working with the Basic Law can hardly afford to buy into the conventional paradigm just described. The Basic Law perceives fundamental rights as anterior to the state and "the state's law" as subject to the objective order of values enshrined in the Basic Law. Law and morality (and law and politics) can therefore not "neatly" be separated. However, to quote Donald 
10/30
The observations of Kommers also go some way to explain a phenomenon that took me by some surprise when I first came across and reflected on it, and that has ever since intrigued me -(also) because German constitutional scholars take it so much for granted that it is hard to find anyone who cares to explain (let alone justify) it. I refer here to the unquestioned use of FC Von Savigny's 23 four "methods of interpretation" for purposes of constitutional interpretation. 
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• systematic interpretation, as a manifestation of contextualism, 32 calling for an understanding of a specific provision in the light of the text or instrument as a whole and of extra-textual indicia;
• purposive interpretation 33 that sheds light on the possible meanings of a provision with reference to its purpose or ratio, and
• historical interpretation situating a provision in the tradition from which it emerged and allowing qualified recourse to information concerning the genesis of the text in which the provision occurs (and concerning the provision itself).
34
In short, I think Savigny's four "methods of interpretation" have found acceptance in German constitutional interpretation because (and simply because) their "reason and logic" (and "pedigree", one might perhaps add) appeal to constitutional scholars and judges (as jurists).
IV
Constitutional-law scholarship in Germany is vast, has a long history and accommodates -as is to be expected -diverse and divergent shades and styles of thinking. Endeavouring to discern a mainstream is contentious. prescribes is certainly a party state and a competitive democracy, while "rule of law" in section 1(c) is the English common law way of saying "Rechtsstaat", though the two are not exactly synonyms. 46 That South Africa is a social state is not really stated in section 1, but it follows by necessary implication from several other constitutional provisions, for example, from section 7(2) that enjoins the state to "promote and fulfil" the rights in the Bill of Rights, from the • Section 7(1) states that the Bill of Rights "affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom".
• 
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Klerk and Another. 52 Part of the package of the section 7 deal was the inclusion in the transitional Constitution of section 35(3), the predecessor to section 39 (2) of the 1996 Constitution, in an attempt to ensure that the provisions of the Bill of Rights will at least have some "radiating effect" on the interpretation and application of non-constitutional law. The wording of the two consecutive provisions is very similar. That is, however, not the case with sections 7(1) and (2) I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.
In some of my own writings I have proposed an adaptation of subsidiarity for use in the South African context. 57 I leave the detail for another occasion. It is important for the present to note that this is an area for very fruitful co-operation with our German counterparts in public law and probably also European lawgiven the history of section 39(2) as product of a Drittwirkung debate.
VIII
The transitional Constitution contained three provisions that were eventually excluded from the 1996 Constitution. Two of them, sections 35(2) and 232 (3) prescribed a widely acknowledged interpretive procedure, known as verfassungskonforme Auslegung in the German context, for the interpretation of, respectively, the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole. 
IX
There is much for which we as scholars of and citizens under the South African Constitution can thank our German counterparts. Fortunately they are not in the bad habit of constantly reminding us of it. In the formerly referred to Humboldt article, the authors conclude:
60
Over almost three decades, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation has contributed substantially to the personal development and growth of a number of jurists who have, in turn, exercised a significant influence on both the theory and the practice of South African law. This the Foundation has achieved without endeavouring to transplant German legal doctrine on its South African counterpart. Rather, scholars have been enabled to develop their own legal thought and theory, and so to be part of the evolution of their legal system as they consider appropriate.
In my experience a similar spirit permeates interaction between South African and German scholars in matters constitutional. And I do not think that especially during the last ten to fifteen years it has been just a one way traffic:
there is indeed much to be learnt from South Africa and especially from our constitutional enterprise of accommodating (and desiring to celebrate) our diversity as an asset. South Africa's "small miracle", à 
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